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REMARKABLE PATUXENT; MARYLAND'S
DEFECTIVE DEFECTIVE DELINQUENT ACT
by Ronald Stanley Schimel '70

There is a growing awareness that our "modern"
penal institutions often cause, rather than cure,
crime. In a recent television and radio interview,
internationally famous trial attorney Edward Bennett
Williams said:
Of course, the last thing that you can ever get
the legislature to address itself to is the prison
problem. It's the last item on national-state
priority. 1 can say this to you in all candor, in my
25 years of practicing law, I have met only one
person whom I think was benefitted by a term in
prison. The one person who was really
rehabilitated. Unfortunately the prisons have
become a breeding ground for crime. You put
young boys in the prisons today and they come
out hardened criminals. It's terrible, it's really
terrible. The whole prison system needs a
tremendous reformation. It's broken down. (Close
Up, WMAL-TV, Feb. 15 , 1970).
Maryland's Defective Delinquent Law which
established Patuxent Institution, specializing in the
incarceration and care of the sociopath, is an attempt
at penal reform. Unfortunately, the attempt has
proven defective.
The seeds of Patuxent were planted in the 194 7
session of the Maryland Legislature when a joint
resol ution (J. Res. No. 16) was passed that created
the Commission to Study Medico-Legal Psychiatry.
On December 28, 1948, that Commission transmitted
its report to Governor William Preston Lane and the
General Assembly. It was therein recommended that
"a new special institution for defective delinquents ..
be established ... ", that there be instituted "legal
procedi.Hes for determination of defective
delinquency and subsequent committment" (sic) and
that "ali defective delinquents ... be detained on an
indeterminate commitment." (Report of Commission
to Study Medico-Legal Psychiatry, Dec. 28, 1948.)
Finally, in 1951, the legislature of the State
enacted Article 31 B, known as the "Defective
Delinquent Law." The law defines a defective
delinquent as
an individual who, by the demonstration of
persistent, aggravated antisocial or criminal
behavior, evidences, a propensity toward criminal
activity, and who is found to have either such
intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or
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both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to
society so as to require such confinement and
treatment, when appropriate, as may make it
reasonably safe for society to terminate the
confinement and treatment. (Md. Code Ann., Art.
31 B ( 1968 ), hereinafter cited The Act.)
The statute provided for both the establishment of
the Patuxent Institution for the commitment of
defective delinquents and indeterminate sentencing
for such committed defective delinquents. The intent
of the statute was the protection of society and the
providing of special psychiatric treatment to
offenders who are currently not classed as legally
insane, but who are psychiatrically viewed as deviant.
As stated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Sas V. Maryland:
The statute rejects the age old concept that
every legally sane person possesses in equal degree
the free will to choose between doing right and
doing wrong. instead it substitutes the concept
that there is a category of legally sane persons who
by reason of mental or emotional deficiency
'evidence a propensity toward criminal activity,'
which they are incapable of controlling. For those
in the category who are treatable it would
substitute psychiatric treatment for punishment in
the conventional sense and would free them from
confinement, not when they have 'paid their debt
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to s9ciety', but when they have been sufficiently
cured to make it reasonably safe to release them.
(334 F. 2d 506, at 517 (1964 ).)
A person may be committed to Patuxent
Institution only if he has been convicted of one or
more of the following crimes:
1. A felony;
2. A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in
the penitentiary;
3. A crime of violence;
4. A sex crime involving:
(a) Physical force or violence,
(b) Disparity of age between an adult and a
minor, or
(c) A sexual act of an uncontrolled and/or
repetitive nature;
5. Two or more convictions in a criminal court for
any offenses or crimes punishable by imprisonment.
(The Act, §6.)
It is further required that the person must have
been sentenced for the crime for which he has been
convicted. Therefore, the offender receives a sentence
before the commencement of the procedure for
commitment to Patuxent.
The sentenced offender may then be sent to
P<\tuxent for diagnosis to determine whether or not
he is a "defective delinquent." The decision to send
him to Patuxent for diagnosis is made by the
sentencing court i.:pon its own motion, or pursuant to
a request by the prosecutor, by the Commissioner of
Correction, by the d efendant himself, or by his
attorney. The referral for diagnosis may immediate ly
follow after sentencing or may be initiated after a
period of imprisonment.
A person referred to Patuxent for diagnosis is
examined to determine whether he is a defective
delinquent. Section 7 of the Act requires that the
examination be made by at least three members of
the staff of whom one must be a psychiatrist, one a
psychologist, and one a medical physician. The
examining experts are required to take into account
not only their own observations but also the crime
for which the person has been sentenced as well as
probation and other reports. On the basis of this
study, they are required to make a written report,
addressed to the court, stating whether the subject is
in their opinion a defective delinquent under the
standards set forth in the definition.
After the report h as been made, the subject is
given a hearing in court to determine whether he shall
be adjudged a defective delinquent. He may elect that
this decision be made by a jury. If the court finds him
to be a defective delinquent, he is then committed to
Patuxent Institution for an indeterminate period.
This means that the commitment is for life unless the
institutional Board of Review decides that the
delinquent has made such progress that it is safe to
return him to society. For this purpose, each inmate 's
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case is reviewed by the institutional Board of Review
at least once a year.
The defective delinquent may also be released by
the court as the result of a rehearing. He is eligible for
such a rehearing when he has been detained at
Patuxent for a p eriod which, together with prior
imprisonment before he was referred to Patuxent,
equals two-thirds of the fixed sentence imposed for
the crime for which he was convicted. This rehearing
determines whether he is still a de fect ive delinqu ent.
Thereafter, he may request a jury trial of this issu e. If
it is decided at the rehearing that he is still a defective
delinquent, he remains committed to Patuxent upon
the same indeterminate basis; if it is decided that he is
no longer a defective delinque nt. he is released from
his confinement at Patuxent, or in the discretion of
the court committed to a prison under his original
sentence. (The Act,§ l 0.)
The system of rewards is the heart of Patuxent's
theory of rehabilitation. At the Institution, the
inmates are grouped in four levels which indicate the
state of their progress in respon se to trea tment. These
levels are distinguished primaril y by the number of
privileges permitted to the inmates on each level.
After an initial period on a receiving tier, most new
patients start at the first level, which has the fewest
number of privileges. Men of the first or lowest tier
are locked in their cells most of the day; they are
permitted only limited recreation, and lights are
turned out by 10 p.m. They must work their way u p
to higher levels by demonstrating coo peration with
the goals of the Institutio n and must manifest a
genuine effort to resolve their personal problems and
to achieve a measure of self-control. Men on the top
tier are locked in only at night, have full access to
crafts shops, have a day room furnished with
cushioned chairs, an d are allowed to decorate their
cells. Generally, the theory at the Institution is that
the motivation for promotion and eventual release
must come from the inmate. Treatme nt is not forced
upon him , but he must exhibit a desire and
willingness to participate in the various programs that
the Institution offers.
The ability to respond to rewards distinguishes
Patuxent inmates from patients at mental hospitals.
Mental patients are, by and large, too far out of touch
with reality to be able to respond to rewa rd
incentives. (Osnos, "Patuxent: Care for Sociopaths,"
The Washington Post, Jan. I I, I 9 70, § C l I , col. I.)
Patuxent has been lavishly praised by the National
Conference of State Trial Judges. " ... Patuxcnt
Institution has proven its worth, that it h as
successfully undergone close judicial scrutiny and
that it represents the most enlightened and
forward-looking approach existing anywhere in the
United States to the solution of the problem of the
sociopathic offe nder." (Report of the Committee on
the Sociopathic Offender relating to Md. 's Defective
Delinquent Statute, 1966, at 10). The Conference

concluded, "It is earnestly believed that the security
in the rehabilitative setting offered by Patuxent
Institution is well worthy of emulation by any of our
states. . . .
The subcommittee commends the
achievement symbolized by Patuxent
Institution . "(Id., at 11.)
The eminent psychiatrist and author of The Crime
of Punishment (1968), Dr. Karl Menninger, also
heartily approves of Patuxent. (Record , vol. 1, pp.
289 , 295: Director vs. Daniels, 243 Md . 16, 221 A. 2d
397 (1966 ). ) "Are the citizens of Baltimore and
Maryland as proud of their remarkable Patuxent,"
asked Menninger, "as they are of their John
Hopkins?" (Osnos, above.)
However, not all people are so enthusiastic in their
support of the Institution as is Dr. Menninger. There
has been a multitude of cases challenging the
Defective Delinquent Act and particularly the
inderminate sentence embodied in it. Even at this
time in Tippett v. Maryland (Appeal docketed, No.
13, 415) the constitutionality of the Act must be
decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The_Act is attacked on three major grounds:
1 . The statutory definition of a defective
delinquent as applied by the Maryland Courts is
insufficiently definite to permit its practical
application within constitutional limitations.
2. The procedures embodied in the Statute are
applied in such a manner as to offend the due process
requirements of the Fifth Amendment and the
confrontation requirements of the Sixth Amendment.
3. Patuxent, in fact, does not furnish treatment
for treatable defective delinquents as distinguished
from other law breakers and hence the Act violates
equal protection of the law.
A statute which fails to give adequate notice of
the conduct prohibited violates the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
statute may fail to give adequate notice because of
vagueness in the language of the statute (Lanzetta v.
N.J., 306 U.S. 451 (1939), the statute made it a
crime to be a member of a gang), or because of a
failure to provide definite standards to govern a jury's
determination in the case (Giaccio v. Pa., 382 U.S.
399 (1966) ). The Defective Delinquent Act, it is
argued, suffers from the latter infirmity; that is, it is
lacking in terms susceptible of objective measurement
(Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ).
The definition of defective delinquent rests on
past antisocial behavior or criminal conduct to
establish a propensity to future antisoeial behavior or
criminal conduct (Comparella v. State, 214 Md. 355,
135 A. 2d 311 (1957) ). However, unlike habitual
offender laws, only one criminal conviction is
required to find a person a defective delinquent and
possibly to incarcerate him for life. All that is needed
is that the defendant engage in "persistent aggravated
anti-social ... behavior." Nowhere in the Act is there a
.definition of'"anti-social" behavior.

In order to be classified as a defective delinquent,
one must also be found "to have either ... intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance ... " Yet is clear
from the joint extract of the Daniels case that there is
no clear measurement of intellectual deficiency.
Daniels achieved scores ranging froin 62 to 88 on I.Q.
tests, (Record, p. 88) and testifying psychiatrists
agreed that such tests, even if the scores had only a
small variance, are an inaccurate measurement of
intelligence. Hence, the juror is left without any
objective method to determine if the accused is
intellectually deficient.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not been of
any help in interpreting the statute. In Palmer v. State
(215 Md. 142, 137 A.2d 119 at 122 (1957)) the
Court made it clear that it understood that emotional
unbalance, as used in the Act, "was to refer to those
people known medically as psychopaths, or as
psychopathic personalities." No doubt the Maryland
Court of Appeals chose the expression "psychopathic
personalities" because the U.S. Supreme Court in
Pearson v. State (309 U.S. 270 (1940) ) upheld a
Minnesota statute that provided for the commitment
of a person with a "psychopathic personality."
However, in the ensuing thirty years since Pearson the
term "psychopath" has been so greatly misused that
it is virtually meaningless today. During the Daniels
trial in 1963, the testifying psychiatrists refused to
utilize the phrase because it was open to so many
different meanings. (Record, above, pp. 113, 264.)
The trial court in Daniels attempted to clarify the
Court of Appeals definition of "emotional
unbalance" but only succeeded in muddying the
waters even more. "Emotional unbalance," it was
explained,
refers to a medically recognized psychiatrically
disordered person, who demonstrates 'persistent
aggravated antisocial or · criminal behavior', and
who exhibits a type of psychiatric disorder
manifested by deepseated emotional conflicts
which distort the individual's attitude toward
society, and of society's attitude toward him,
resulting in an uncontrollable desire and need to
create continuing hostile acts toward society and
which is uncontrollable by the individual. (Director
v. Daniels, 243 Md. 36, at 37 (1964.))
It is submitted that this definition of
emotional unbalance is worthless in that it
merely restates the elements of defective delinquency that are apparent in the Act. It seems
obvious that anyone who demonstrates a "persistent
aggravated anti-social ... behavior" by necessity must
be harboring "deepseated emotional conflicts which
distort the individual's attitude toward society .. .':
Also, it is equally obvious that "an uncontrollable
desire and need to create continuing hostile acts to
society" (Daniels, at 37) by its very nature "evidences
a propensity toward criminal activity." (The Act,
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§5.) Thus, it can be seen that the Circuit Court's
definition of "emotional unbalance" merely restates,
rather than adds to, the Act's definition of defective
delinquent.
Dr. Harold E. Boslow, Director of Patuxent
Institution, has commented on the inherent difficulty
of defining " emotional unbalance."
The problem of determining 'emotional unbalance'
is a much knottier one. We are clearly not dealing
here with a simple dichotomy involving balance
versus unbalance, rather, the concept of
intelligence, suggests a graded continuum involving
a wide range of behaviors. Since no individual can
be reasonably said to have achieved perfect
emotional balance, whatever that might mean, we
would presumably infer that every individual
shows some degree of emotional unbalance. Thus,
with this kind of interpretation of the terms, which
akin to sophistry, we would commit as a defective
delinquent any individual who engaged in
persistent anti-social behavior which cohstituted a
danger to society.

larcenies), evidences a propensity toward criminal
activity (a thief quite obviously evidences a
propensity toward criminal activity) and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency
(not defined by the Act or by the Maryland Court
of Appeals), or emotional unbalance (The
Maryland Court of Appeals has defined emotional
unbalance as being a psychopath, but psychopath
has been rejected by authorities as being a
nondescript term. The Circuit Court has altogether
failed to define the phrase.) or both , as to clearly
demonstrate an actual danger to society (thieves
are obviously a danger to society) so as to require
such confinement and treatment, when
appropriate, as may ,make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and
treatment.
If the Act can be applied to a person who committed

two largenices then it can be applied to almost any
type of criminal. Yet, the Act was not intended for,
and has not been applied to, all criminals. The
foregoing points out the evil that the Supreme Court
warned of when it said , "men of common intelligence
Clearly, this is not the intent of the law. If we had cannot be required to guess at the meaning of the
tescs of emotional balance similar to tests of enactment. (Winters v. N.Y ., 333 U.S. (1948) .)
intelligence , where we could determine reasonable
Regardless of whether one thinks of the defective
cutting scores below which an individual could be delinquent hearing as civil or penal in nature, the
said to be sufficiently, emotionally unbalanced to accused is still entitled to the full protection of due
be considered a defective delinquent, our task process of law , since the result of the judicial hearing
would be considerably simplified. However, no is incarceration. (In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).)
such tests are available although, of course, there The Oliver case concerned itself with a civil commitare several which are of great value in estimating ment for civil contempt. The petitioner was ordered
the extent of emotional unbalance in many cases. confined in the County Jail for a period of time , or
In the final analysis, we must rely quite heavily on until such time as he shall appear and answer
case history criteria and on clinical impressions questions propounded to him by the Court. The
regarding the individual. Such impressions are not Supreme Court held that the requirements of due
always as easily defended in court as objective, process, including notice, impartiality, hearing, a fair
standardized measures and it is hoped that such trial, and right to counsel, are properly within the
measures will be derived in the future. (British framework of ordered liberty and are such an
Journal of Delinquency, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 6, July inherent, necessary and concomitant part of the
1959.)
American way of life, that they cannot be taken away
merely by labeling a process civil rather than criminal.
Accordingly, for all intents and purposes "emotional
The Oliver case was the forerunner of Malloy v.
unbalance" remains undefined and inapplicable to a Hogan (378 U.S. 1 (1964) ).Malloy holds that the
given case. A review of Maryland cases points out the Fifth Amendment 's protection against compulsory
actual difficulties incurred in interpreting and self-incrimination is incorporated by the Fourteenth
applying the defective delinquent definition. (See, for Amendment. Malloy overruled the majority of the
example, Palmer v. State, 215 Md. 142, 137 A. 2d. opinions of the Maryland Court of Appeals that held
119 (1957) .)
that the first ten amendments were not incorporated
The vagueness and breadth' of the definition, as by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is noteworthy that
construed by the courts, can be demonstrated by Malloy was a civil case.
applying it to an individual who has been twice
Keeping in mind, then, that due process is
convicted of larceny of the contents of an required in any judicial hearing that can result in
automobile.
incarceration, let us return to the process by which
one is found to be a defective delinquent to discover
A defective delinquent shall be defined as an if and when the various due process safeguards are
individual (the thief) who, by the demonstration of disregarded. After an examination is ordered, the
persistent aggravated antisocial ... behavior (two convict suspected to be a defective delinquent is
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transferred to Patuxent Institution and examined by
a medical physician, a psychiatrist, and a
psychologist, who on the basis of their examinations
and studies of the suspected defective delinquent, the
circumstances of the originating crime, copies of any
probation or other reports about him, and reports as
to his social, physical, mental and psychiatric
condition and general history, determine whether the
suspected person is or is not a defective delinquent.
(The Act, § 7a.) At this stage, defective delinquency
vel non is determined in an inquisitional , not an
adversarial, proceeding. In the ordinary case , the
State at this juncture affords the convict a
psychiatrist of his choice ; this, however, is not true
when the convict himself has requested the
examination. (The Act, § 7b.) If the institutional
examination is negative, a,. . .,convict desirous of the
benefits of Patuxcnt Institution has no redress.
If the institutional report states that the suspected
person is a defective delinquent, the convict is
brought before the criminal court that sentenced him
and he is entitled to counsel of his choice and a jury
trial. At the defective delinquency determination
hearing, the s·tate has the burden of establishing by a
mere preponderance of the evidence , and not beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the convict is a defective
delinquent. (McCloskey v. Director, 230 Md. 635,
187 A. 2d 833 (1963 ). ) If a jury is prayed, the jury is
judge of the fact only and not of law and fact
(Purks v. Director,
224 Md. 643, 166 A. 2d 917
(1961) ), as in criminal cases. (See Md. Const., Art.
15 , § 5.)
The State's evidence at the hearing is essentially
that of expert witnesses, whose " ... expert findings
and conclusions are to be accorded very serious
consideration, particularly in a case such as this one,
when the trial court almost necessarily must rely to a
considerable degree on the opinions of expert
witnesses." (Palmer, at 125; Purks, at 917 .) The
institutional experts who testify for the State are not
in a patient-physician relationship with the criminal
and may testify as to matters learned from the
convict in interviews and tests even when the same
concern prior criminal offenses and convictions and
admissions of prior anti-social conduct. (Simmons v.
Director, 227 Md. 661 , 177 A. 2d409(1962) ; Purks,
above.) Extensive hearsay regarding the social,
physical, mental and criminal condition and history is
admitted, over objection, at the hearing since the Act
is deemed to require the introduction of it and the
purpose of the law would be defeated unless evidence
of antecedent conduct is presented upon which to
establish the propensity toward criminal activity.
(Simmons.)

The one psychiatrist of the criminal's own choice
is not in the position of a medical expert as in an
adversary proceeding. He is considered to be
"independent." He is required to submit a written
report of his examination and findings to the Court

for consideration by the trier of fact. The defendant
has no control over the admission of the report of
this independent psychiatrist , and the
physician-patient relationship does not apply.
(Simmons.)

Defendant's counsel has access to the records and
reports of Patuxent which he can put into evidence
just as can the State. (The Act, § 8.) The defendant
also has discovery procedures available to him
pursuant to the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Purks.)

If the defendant is found not to be a defective
delinquent, he is returned to the custody of the
Department of Correction under his original criminal
sentence, with credit for time spent in Patuxent and
credit for behavior at Patuxent pursuant to the
provisions of the State criminal code. (The Act , §9a;
Md. Ann. Code, Art . 27, § 688.) If, on the other
hand, the defendant is found to be a defective
delinquent , the Court is required to commit him to
the Patuxent Institution " for an indeterminate period
without either maximum or minimum limits" and the
sentence for the originating crime is suspended. (The
Act. §9b :) The defective delinquent convict can be
in-c arcerated at Patuxent Institution after his
originating criminal sentence has expired, the purpose
of his confinement being not to punish, but to receive
"such confinement and treatment, when appropriate,
as may make it reasonably safe for society to
terminate the confinement and treatment .... " (The
Act,§ 5.) If he should escape this confinement, even
if his originating criminal sentence has expired, he is
guilty of the crime of escape under the provisions of
,the criminal code.(Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 139;
McCloskey, above.)
· -During incarceration at Patuxent, the Institutional
Board of Review may request the original criminal
court to reinstate and reimpose the original criminal
sentence upon the defective delinquent, who is then
imprisoned in a penal institution though he is still a
defective delinquent. (The Act, § l 3d.) Any person in
the custody of the Patuxent Institution may be
transferred by administrative decision, without a
hearing, to the Department of Correction for
imprisonment. (The Act, § 16d.) This administrative
transfer to a penal institution for imprisonment may
take place regardless of whether the originating
criminal sentence has expired. Therefore, it is possible
that a convict sentenced to a determinate criminal
sentence could, after a defective delinquency
determination, spend the rest of his life in the
penitentiary.
During Patuxent confinement, the defective
delinquent is subject to the term of his suspended
original criminal sentence, and if released prior to its
expiration, may be required to serve the remainder of
that sentence. (The Act,§§ lOa, 13f.)
The Institutional Board of Review is required to
review and re-examine each defective delinquent
SPRING 1970/PAGE 5

annually, utilizing examination procedures used in
the first determination and make a recommendation
for the future status and treatment of each inmate so
reviewed. (The Act, § l 3b.) After a defective
delinquent has been confined for two-thirds of his
original criminal sentence or for a period of two
years, whichever is longer, he may file a petition for
redetermination of his defective delinquency. (The
Act, § 1Oa.) If the inmate is found not ~o be a
ddective delinqu'e nt, the Court may discharge
him from confinement or commit him under his
original sentence with credit for time spent at
Patuxent and credit for behavior at Patuxent
pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code. (The
Act, § lOa; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 688.) If the
inamate is found to be a defective delinquent,
excepting his application for leave to appeal, he is
denied further petitions for review until intervals of
no less than three years have elapsed. (The Act, §
!Ob.)

It is apparent that extensive hearsay evidence is
the major basis for the possible lifetime confinement
at Patuxent. As shown, a defective delinquent is
deprived of his liberty upon a preponderance of
evidence offered under a vague definition. The Act is
deemed to require the introduction of hearsay
evidence of past antisocial conduct, extending as far
in the past as can be obtained. The evidence
presented by the State is almost exclusively that of
State psychiatrists who testify on the basis of
unsworn reports as to the defective delinquent's past,
his persistent and aggravated antisocial or criminal
behavior, the defective delinquent's propensity
toward criminal activity or antisocial behavior, his
tendency toward unbalance and his actual danger to
society.
Anything the defective delinquent says or fails to
say to the State's psychiatrist or his own psychiatrist,
whether during examination or treatment, may be
used against him. Under these circumstances, the
silence of the suspected defective delinquent in Court
is as damaging as silence in the Institution. (McDonough v. Director, 229 Md. 626, 183A. 2d 368
( 1962).) The proceedings have a direct tendency
to require the defective delinquent, a convict, to take
the stand to testify about his past conduct, including
criminal and antisocial behavior.
The failure to call the defendant's own
psychiatrist as a witness may be commented upon at
the trial. (Hoverter v. Director, 23 1 Md. 608, 188 A.
2d 696 ( 1963).) Furthermore, the defendant's right
to be an independent psychiatrist is a hollow right,
for the psychiatrist, as a practical matter, can do little
more than base his opinion on his examination of the
defective delinquent and the extensive data compiled
by the State with its limitless resources. Given the
same background data as that available to the State,
the opinion of the "independent" psychiatrist is but a
feedback of the institutional determination. Thus, the
PAGE 6/SPRING 1970

Act, as construed shifts the burden of proof to the
suspected defective delinquent who in confinement
has the least opportunity to carry this burden.
Additionally, a person suspected of defective
delinquency is denied a hearing as to whether he will
be aided by treatment and whether any treatment is
available to him. (Purks; Queen v. Director, 226 Md.
664, 174 A. 2d 351 (1961). ) After confinement
without maximum or minimum limits, the Institution
administratively determines ex parte whether
treatment is "appropriate." In view of the
far-reaching and perhaps devastating nature of the
commitment, a determination as to treatment should
be required. Thus, there is no preliminary judicial
determination of the very basis upon which the State
asserts its power to so seriously restrict liberty . The
hearing on this question is even more necessary where
the State is admittedly acting in a novel and
experimental area of penology. (Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).) To say that Maryland can confine indeterminately a treatable defective delinquent
without a preliminary finding as to that fact and the
availability of treatment to him , is to admit that the
State is imprisoning defective delinquents, possibly
for life, and at the same time depriving them of selfhelp and those treatment resources otherwise available in sociei.y.
From the foregoing, it is difficult to see how a
defective delinquent proceeding, based on hearsay
and coerced self-incriminating evidence can be
anything but a violation of the "fair play" rules of
due process. Additionally, the fact that the accused is
foreclosed from discovering if treatment will be made
available to him if he is confined gives rise to great
concern for the possibility that a treatable person can
be needlessly imprisoned for life at Patuxent merely
because no treatment was made available to him.
A most disturbing aspect of Patuxent is that it
appears that treatable patients are not getting the
therapy they need; accordingly, they are being
incarcerated for much longer periods than are
necessary. The treatment, or rather lack thereof,
accorded to inmates is highlighted by the following
sketches of two of the petitioners in Tippett v. State
(Appeal, No. 13,425):
CHARLES MASON TIPPETT. Tippett has been a
"patient" at Patuxent since its doors opened. His
most obvious defect is that he stutters. The
Institution has stated that, "he stutters so badly that
one can hardly understand him on many occasions.
On such times, he goes into spasmodic jerking
movements of his arms and legs." (Id., Record, at
23 .) After ten years as a patient, no speech therapist
had been provided for him. (Id., at 25.)
GEORGE CRESWELL. Mr. Creswell had been
seen by the Institutional psychiatrist once in 1962,
once in 1963, once in 1964, and five times in 1965.
The doctor conceded that each visit did
not even take a couple of hours. (Id., at 44.)

Accordingly, over a period of four years. Creswell was
"treated" by a psychiatrist , a maximum of sixteen
hours. It is apparent that the treatment afforded
Tippett and Creswell is wholly inadequate.
An examination of the testimony in Daniels v.
State (Record, vol. 1), an appeal from a redetermination hearing, further points up the problem. Daniels
was a treatable inmate at Patuxent (Id., at 70); the
file contained mostly notices of disciplinary infraction (Id., at 71 ). The file indicated that Daniels had
an I.Q. of 88 (Id., at 88), yet he was not given special
education (Id., at 89). Asked if Patuxent resembled
a hospital, Dr. Meng, a psychiatrist, replied " It doesn't
look much different from a military prison .. .. It looks
like a prison, to me." (Id., at 91 ). A second psychiatrist testified that he could see no difference between
Patuxen t and the naval security prison in Portsmouth,
and that Daniel's file indicated to him that Daniels
had not been treated in over five years (Id., at 209).
It was also brought to light during the trial that the
guards at Patuxent receive no special training for
handling defective delinquents; the guards are
selected from the same pool of men from which the
state pri§ons select; and the guards are often
interchanged between Patuxent and the prisons. (Id.,
at 256.)
Indeed , the "treatment" aspect of Patuxent is
disturbing, but even more disturbing is the fact that
the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that on an
appeal from a redetermination hearing petitioner's
"complaint that he receive no 'treatment' at Patuxent
until two months before the hearing is immaterial to
the issue, even if true." (Queen.) This clearly flies in
the face of the express language of the Act; Section 5
therein talks in terms of "treatment' when it says " ...
to require such confinement and treatment, when
appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and treatment"
(emphasis added ).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia is in disagreement with the
Maryland Court of Appeals. In Rouse v. Cam~ron
(373 F. 2d 451 (1966)) appellant was found not
guilty, by reason of insanity, of carrying a dangerous
weapon, a misdemeanor for which the maximum
imprisonment was one year. At the time of appeal,
Rouse had spent four years in a mental hospital. He
claimed that he received no psychiatric treatment and
that it was error for the district judge to refuse to
consider this in his habeas corpus petition. Judge
Bazelon, for the Court of Appeals, agreed with
Rouse :
Regardless of the statutory authority, involuntary
confinement without treatment is 'shocking'. (Id.,
at 455.)

*

*

*

The hospital need not show that the treatment will
cure or improve him but only that there is a bona

fide effort to do so. This requires the hospital to
show that initial and periodic inquiries are made
into the needs and condition of the patient with a
view to providing suitable treatment for him, and
that the program provided is suited to his
particular needs. Treatment that has therapeutic
value for some may not have such value for others.
(Id., at 456.)

*

*

*

*

*

*

One who is 'in custody 111 violation of the
Constitution and laws' of the United States is
entitled to relief in habeas corpus, and the court is
required to 'dispose of the matter as law and
justice require'. If the court finds that a
mandatorily committed patient, such as appellant,
is in custody in violation of the Constitution and
laws, it may allow the hospital a reasonable
opportunity to initiate treatment. (Id., at 458.)
Unconditional or conditional release may be in
order if it appears thr.t the opportunity for
treatment has been exhausted or treatment is
otherwise inappropriate. (Id., at 458. )
It is submitted that without a showing that a
treatable inmate receives treatment over and above
that available at the state prisons, the Act will violate
the equal protection inherent in the Fifth
amendment. (Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954 ). ) Two men guilty of exactly the same crime
and with virtually identical records could be
incarcerated for greatly divergent periods of time.
The one "lucky" enough to find his way to the prison
could be free on parole in a few years whereas the
"unlucky" convict who becomes a patient at
Patuxent waits there his entire life for the cure that
never comes. Laws are usually based upon
classifications of persons or property ; the
classification itself must be rational, bearing some
reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.
(Nebbia v. New York, U.S. 502 (1934).) In this
instance the classification is the defective delinquent
as opposed to the ordinary criminal. However, due to
the extreme vagueness and breadth of the defective
delinquent definition and the fact that 70-75% of the
people in the penitentiary are repeaters and
sociopaths (Tippett, Record, at 5 21 ), one has great
doubts as to the rational basis of the classification.
An additional ground to question the classification's
reasonable basis is the object of the legislation; if the
treatment aspect of Patuxent is disregarded, then the
only possible object of the legislation, particularly the
indeterminate sentence aspect of it, is the protection
of society. If that be the case, then why release from
prisons individuals who have served their terms but
who will undoubtedly commit other crimes, when
inmates of Patuxent cannot leave until they no longer
pose threats to society.
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Maryland's Defective Delinquent Act has achieved
only one of its two objectives. By incarcerating a
criminal at Patuxent until he is no longer dangerous,
society assures itself of far greater protection than if
the criminal is merely incarcerated for a fixed period
of time.
There is little or no assurance that the Act's
second objective, the cure of the sociopath, has been
achieved. Due to the vague definition of defective
delinquent and inadequate procedural safeguards, it is
uncertain that the Act is being applied to those
criminals for which it was originally intended. It is
equally as uncertain that Patuxent is doing all that
can reasonably be done to rehabilitate the patient so
that he can rejoin society at the earliest possible time.
These uncertainties can be relieved to a certain
extent. First, a new effort must be made to redefine
defective delinquent so that the intended criminal
will clearly fall under the Act. The phrases
"aggravated antisocial ... behavior," "intellectual
deficiency" and "emotional unbalance" must be
explained in the Act. Second, during the
determination hearing the inmate must be given the
opportunity to cross-examine those doctors whose

conclusory findings are read from the patient's file
into the record . Third, if no better definition can be
developed and no greater procedural safeguards
initiated in the determination hearing to make
reasonably certain that the Act is being applied to a
" true" defective delinquent, then the indeterminate
sentence should be stricken from the Act. This will
result in a lessening of societal protection but will
assure Constitutionally guaranteed "equal protection
of the law ." Finally, if the inderminate sentence is
retained, then the State must demonstrate, in a
redetermination hearing, that there has been a bona
fide attempt at rehabilitation. Indeed, a right to
treatment in some form is recognized by law in many
states. Patuxent's staff should be required to keep
records detailing psychiatric care and other treatment
and should make them available to the patient's
attorney.
A circuit judge in Maryland best expressed the
apprehension that Patuxent and the indeterminate
sentence have created , "What happens if a fellow gets
forgotten there or if there is ill will against him? We
are locking the door and throwing away the key."
(Osnos, above.)

EXECUTING A LEGAL DECISION
by Andrew Robert Green '70

Andrew Robert Greene
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In a country which prides itself on being a nation
of laws, not men, when the courts have reached a
final decision, the men must put aside their personal
likes and dislikes and implement the law. Yet, when
the decision involves deeply held beliefs and
traditions, and the legal solution addresses itself to
moral, social, economic, and political problems, the
implementation· of that legal decision becomes a
matter of great complexity. In this country political
figures are often charged with the duty to execute the
law. The electorate to whom they are responsible
may have real or assumed disagreement with the
implementation of court's decision in question. Such
a conflict produces major political crises, with each
side seeking to exploit for political gain and avoid
political loss.
School integration has proved to be a fertile
source of such confrontation. We have seen a whole
series of governors involved with succeeding
presidents. Ross Barnett, the University of
Mississippi, James Meredith were names of nearly a
decade ago ; but Claude Kirk and Bradenton, Florida
were just last month. The play is the same, the names

have changed, but the characters are the same. A new
president with a different philosophy now has the
duty executing the decisions of democracy.
On January 31, 1961. Jam es Howard Meredith,
describing himself as "an American-Mississippi-Negro
citizen," applied for admission to the University of
Mississippi at Oxford. In the letter accompanying the
application he voiced the "hope that this matter will
be handled in a manner complimentary to the
University and to the State of Mississippi." On
October I. 1962. James Howard Meredith enrolled at
Ok Miss.
Between these two dates lie sixteen months of
litigation in federal courts, ten days . of physical
confrontation between fed '? ral and state officials, a
night of murderous rioting, and the most serious clash
of state versus Federal authority since the end of the
Civil War. The analysis of the ultimately successful
resolution of this 'crisis is the topic of this paper.
According to Theodore Sorensen, the fundamental
nature of the White House makes it inevitable that
vital decisions will be made there and that the same
basic forces and factors will repeatedly shape these
decisions. And if it is true that Presidential power is
the power to persuade -- to convince men to varying
degrees of authority and autonomy that what the White
House wants of them is what they ought to do for
their sake and on their authority -- it is also true that
the only means of guarding his own prospects for
effective influence are a President's choices, his
decisions, his acts of doing or not doing.
A President's decisions, postulates Sorensen , are
set within at least five ever-present limitations. He is
free to choose only within the limits of permissibility,
available resources, available time, previous
commitments, and available information. Yet despite
these limitations -- which must be accepted as
political facts of life -- it would still seem that a
President's authority and status give him great
advantages in dealing with the men he would
persuade : " ... the White House now controls the most
encompassing array of vantage points in the American
political system. With hardly an exception, the men
who share in governing this country are aware that at
some time, in some degree, the doing of their jobs,
the furthering of th eil• ambitions, may depend upon
the President of the United States. Their need for
presidential action , or their fear of it, is bound to be
recurrent if not actually continuous. Their need or
fear is his advantage." (Neustadt, Presidential Power)
If Presidents could count on their own conduct to
provide them enough bargaining advantages, effective
bargaining might be easier to manage than it often is.
Yet in practice, if not theory, many crucial choices
never were the President's to make. Decisions that are
legally in others' hands, or delegated past recall , have
an unhappy way of proving just the trading stock
most needed when the White House wants to trade.

And too often a President finds that events or the
decisions of others have limited his freedom of
maneuver.
Walter Lord has observed sympathetically of the
Mississippi crisis that the "New Frontiersmen, who
considered themselves students as well as
practitioners of government, never had a better case
study in the mysteries of decision-making. All sorts of
ingredients went into the pot: determination to
enforce court orders ... the hope to avoid troops .. .
the memory th.at marshals had worked before .. .
belated recognition of Mississippi's recolcitrance .. .
belief that Barnett desperately wanted some way out
... fear that the Governor could no longer control his
people."(Lord, The Past That Would Not Die.) It is to
an examination of these factors that we now turn our
attention.
For people in the North - and that includes the
decision-makers in Washington -- the case of James
Meredith and his attempts to enroll at the University
of Mississippi was a simple matter of upholding the
law. In Mississippi the issues were not so clear-cut.
Professor James Silver has called Mississippi the
"closed society" and the reality of just such a
concept was to frustrate many of the plans
Washington was making. It would appear that the
Kennedy Administration failed to appreciate the
implications -- or perhaps even the existence - of such
a condition. But the fact remains that Governor
Barnett was both a leader and a victim of the closed
society and its role, therefore, must be examined.
Unlike several other Southern states, Mississippi
never had any urban centers where bitterness and
prejudice could be partially dissipated. Instead it
became the stomping ground of the demagogue where
men were elected by being more pro-segregationist
than their opponent. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's school integration decision in 1954 was
received with regretful acceptance. Race relations
were at a good point and , while Mississippi had not
changed its views on segregation, good times and a
new generation seemed to promise better inter-racial
communication. In this climate, responsible
leadership might well have given substance to the
Court's decision, for the average Mississippian
believed in law and order. Instead the leadership was
silent - not only in Mississippi, but in Washington as
well. There was no comment from the local churches,
educators, the responsible press, or even the bar.
Into this vacuum came the Citizens' Council - an
ardent band of white supremacists whose sense of
power was matched only by their skill. They knew
exactly what they wanted, and as past masters of the
art of state politics, they knew exactly the chords to
strike that would best arouse the average frightened,
isolated, white Mississippian. The result of this
take-over was the closed society: "For whatever
reason, the community sets up the orthodox view. Its
people are constantly indoctrinated - not a difficult
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task, since they are inclined to the accepted creed by
circumstance." (Silver, The Clos e d S ociety . )
As early as 1955 , Senator James Eastland had
proclaimed to the youth of the state that they were
obligated to defy the Supreme Court ; all court
decisions, according to Governor Ross Barnett (the
Citizens' Council candidate in 1959), must comply
with · his view of states' rights. By 1962. Governor
Barnett and the politicians around him had created a
climate of total disbelief that the United States
Government would ever enforce integration in
Mississippi. And to bolster this united front, the state
legislature churned out an endless stream of helpful
statutes. One obvious measure allowed the governor
to close any school threatened with desegregation.
Another established a State Sovereignty Commission.
One choice item required all members of the
executive branch of the state government to prohibit
compliance with the Supreme Court desegregation
· rulings and to prohibit integration of any public
facilities.
Once the Citizens' Council had assumed power,
the rest of the story was bound to unfold as a battle
against the United States: "The point is that when
people are told from every public rostrum in the state
on every day of their lives ... that no authority on
earth can legally or morally require any change in the
traditional terms of Mississippi social life, this very
process generates conditions that will explode into
riot and insurrection ." (Silver.) The central difficulty
was that the rest of the country did not see this. The
nature of our system , which assumes reasonable
national loyalty and good faith on critical issues,
made national awareness of the situation impossible.
The nation was blinded by its own rationale.
· James Meredith's efforts for enrollment were
fundamentally legal ones. After his application for
the Spring 1961 semester at Ole Miss was rejected and
subsequent inquiries met with no success, he took his
case into Federal District Court. His complaint
charging discrimination and asking for injunctive
relief was filed on May 31, 1961. On December 12,
1961 , that Court denied Meredith's contention and
his motion for injunction. He appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which
on June 25, 1962, reached the following conclusions;
A full review of the record leads the Court
inescapably to the conclusion that from the
moment the defendants discovered Meredith
was a Negro they engaged in a carefully
calculated campaign of delay, harassment, and
~asterly inactivity. It was a defense designed to
discourage and to defeat by evasive tactics
which would have been a credit to Quintus
Fabius Maximus.
Reading the 1350 pages in the record as a
whole, we find that James Meredith's
application for transfer to the University of

Mississippi was turned down solely because he
was a Negro. We sec no valid
non-discriminatory reason for the university's
not accepting Meredith . Instead . we see a
well-defined pattern of delays and frustrations .
part of a Fabian policy of worrying the enemy
into defeat while time worked for the
defenders.
The decision of the Court of Appeals (305 F. 2d
343) was implemented on .July 28 , 1962, by a
mandate of the Court which issued an order for
admission of Meredith. immediate evaluation of his
credits, and prohibition of prosecution. Ultimately
this mandate was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court through Justice Hugo Black. The next
day. September 13, 1962 , the Federal District Court
issued a permanent injunction for the admission of
Meredith.
Justice Black's ruling found all the factions of
Mississippi's tangled politics tugging and pulling
Barnett at once . At a series of talks on the night of
the decision he was told by leading lawyers that
Mississippi had reached the end of the road . that
there was nothing left except compliance. But others
urged him to "make his mark , stand by his
principles'' . In the end the Governor chose the route
of defiance , the line urged by the toughest faction of
the Citizens' Council.
On September 13 , the Governor appeared on a
statewide telecast and promised the people of
Mississippi : "We will not surrender to the evil and
illegal forces of tyranny . ... We must either submit to
the unlawful dictates of the federal government or
stand up like men and tell them 'NEVER!'" (Lord.)
The Governor rested his legal case against James
Meredith's admission to the university on the theory
that Mississippi in its supreme sovereignty could
"interpose" itself between the federal court and the
university. The Court of Appeals was later to charge
that "all informed persons know that this political
poppycock (i.e. , interposition) has never been
recognized in a court of law. But the uninformed, the
uneducated, the very persons likely to resort to
violence , were certain to be misled when their chief
executive 'interposed' himself between the United
States and the University of Mississippi." (346 F. 2d
99 . )

Up until this point, James Meredith had been a
private citizen trying to obtain justice. But in the face
of this persistent defiance by Governor Barnett, the
Federal Government acted to become directly
involved. On September 18, the Court of Appeals
allowed the United States to appear in the case as
am icus curiae "in order to maintain and preserve the
due administration of justice and the integrity of the
judicial processes of the United States." (330 F.2d
369.)
Despite injunctions and restraining orders, open
and avowed defiance of the federal courts continued.
PAGE 10/SPRING 1970

At hearings several months after the cns1s, the
specifics of this defiance were cited: The doctrine of
interposition had been adopted by a resolution of the
Mississippi legislature and by a proclamation of
Governor Barnett: criminal prosecution had been
instituted against Meredith because of his efforts to
enroll; the State of Mississippi enacted Senate Bill
150 l, the effect of which was to punish Meredith for
SL'eking to enroll at Ole Miss. More dramatic were the
direct confrontations between Meredith and his
Justice Department protectors and Governor Barnett
and Lieutenant Governor Paul Johnson. The Court of
Ap1wals, on September 28 and 29, found these men
guilty of contempt for blocking Meredith's admission.
The judges, their patience exhausted, then directed
the Federal Government to enforce the court's order
and to put down what bordered on rebellion.
At tile same time the question of violence was
becoming serious. By September 27 , Barnett clearly
realized that till' statL' was perilously close to
explosion. This was chilling, for Barnett was a
thoroughly non-violent man. So something had to be
done . The state's people, if they were out of control,
would never swallow compliance; and certainly
Barnett's own career would be smashed beyond
recovery. Something had to be found that would
combine compliance with the grandeur of resistance;
something that would somehow convey the picture of
a still-sovereign state bowing only before the
overwhelming force of another power. With fois in
mind, Barnett, through intermediaries. made
overtures to Washington.
The conflicting pressures on the main participants
complicated the negotiations between them.
Throughout these negotiations the governor
emphasized three points : first, there would have to be
a show of force so that he could say that he was
overwhelmed: second, he was not sure he could
control his own supporters and even some law
enforcement officers: and third, he was reluctant to
promise maintenance of law and order. The President
and the Attorney General insisted repeatedly that
Barnett commit himself to the maintenance of order,
although they were willing to take him "off the
hook" with a show of force. On Saturday, September
29. the President sent a telegram in which he
demanded by that evening an answer on that point,
and shortly before midnight the Governor telephoned
that he would not make the commitment. Therefore,
shortly after midnight, the President issued a
proclamation federalizing the Mississippi National
Guard.
The following morning, Sunday, September 30, in
a series of secret telephone conversations with the
Attorney General and the President, Barnett
suggested that he be permitted to stand courageously
in the door of the school and yield only when a
marshal's gun was pointed at him. But that little

drama would have risked violence from menacing
groups of students, sheriffs, state p_olice, and
hangers-on who gathered for each such confrontation.
(Sorenson, Kennedy.) At this point, the fragile
patience of Attorney General Kennedy finally
snapped. He well knew that the President was already
under heavy fire for apparently dawdling the past two
days. With a civilian solution in sight, it seemed worth
it; but now the Governor was suggesting a military
charade. The Attorney General abruptly warned the
Governor that the President was going on the air in a
few hours, would describe their earlier agreement
and say that Barnett was reneging.
Still trying to save face, the Governor - who was
in no position to tell the people that he had made any
deals at all -- then proposed that Meredith be spirited
quickly and quietly onto the campus that very
afternoon, before the President's speech. He told the
Attorney General that the state police would keep
outsiders off the campus; and that, while he would
have to say that he had yielded to overwhelming
force, he would condemn any talk of violence and
urge that the fight be carried forward in the courts.
After Barnett stressed that a large force of state
police would assure the safety of Meredith and that
there would be no need for National Guardsmen or
other forces, the Kennedys agreed to the plan as a
means of avoiding Barnett's arrest (and thus making a
martyr out of him) and a troop deployment. As
Walter Lord writes: "But overriding all other factors
was Washington's ardent desire to avoid using troops.
This always remained paramount with ... Kennedy ... ;
so when the Governor's feeler arrived -- with
assurances that it would solve everything - it was just
too much to resist."
The possibility of domestic violence made the
President more anxious than usual. Theodore
Sorenson recounts that after his conversations with
Barnett, Kennedy carefully rewrote the speech he
planned to make on nationwide television Sunday
evening. He tried to make it clear that the
government was merely carrying out the orders of the
court in a case it had not brought and was not forcing
anything down the throats of Mississippians on its
own initiative. The tone of the President's message
was calm, but firm:
... our Nation is founded on the principle that
observance of the law is the eternal safeguard of
liberty and defiance of the law is the surest
road to tyranny ....
Americans are free, in short, to disagree with
the law but not to disobey it. For in a
government of laws and not of men, no man,
however prominent or powerful, and no mob,
however unruly or boisterous, is entitled to
defy a court of law ....
My obligation under the Constitution "and the
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statutes of the
implement the
whatever means
force and civil
permit.

United States was and is to
orders of the court with
are necessa ry, and with as little
disorder as the circumstances

By l O P.M. when the President went on the air,
Barnett had already issued his statement. His aides
informed the White House that no further forces
would be needed (about four hundred marshals,
border patrolmen, and Federal prison guards had
accompanied Meredith). But the two hundred state
police he had provided had suddenly vanished
without notice at the first sign of tension, returning
only after a bitter protest to the Governor's office
from the Attorney General. Now an ugly mob was
gathering around the band of marshals as the
President began to speak.
l11e rioting began in earnest at the very moment
the Preside1it began his appeal for order. Realizing
they could expect little or no help from any state
officials, the marshals were forced to use tear gas to
defend themselves from the mob. The riot lasted
through, the night; two men were killed and hundreds
were injured, including a third of the marshals. As the
hours dragged on, the President made his final
decision and United States Army troops were pouring
into Oxford by the pre-dawn hours.
On Monday morning, October 1, 1962, with tear
gas still in the air, and automobiles set afire hours
before still smoldering, James Howard Meredith was
registered at the University of Mississippi.
The events of Jam es Meredith's admission to the
University of Mississippi culminated in violence
carefully produced by forces which could not
anticipate the destructiveness of the explosion.
Neither Federal nor State officials wanted what
happened, yet neither was willing to prevent it. Given
their respective positions, neither was able to prevent
it. The executive branch of the United States was
bound to enforce the law and therefore make the
necessary preparations for enforcement. Governor
Barnett was personally and politically committed to
resist enforcement, by lawful means if possible and
by unlawful means if necessary. At no point was
there really any doubt, in Mississippi at least, that he
would resort to the latter.
In a very real sense, the President had no choice as
to whether or not the orders of the court would be
carried out. In his television speech on Sunday
evening, Kennedy stressed the role of the Federal
Government: " ... the United States Court of Appeals
. .. made clear the fact that the enforcement of its
order had become an obligation of the United States
Government. Even though this Government had not
originally been a party to the case, my responsibility
as President was therefore inescapable." The
fundamental decision was therefore the manner in
which the President's responsibility would be
exercised.
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To the decision-makers in Washington , only one
thing was crystal-clear: they did not want to use
troops. For one thing, the Kennedy Ad ministration
had made so much of Eisenhower's handling of Little
Rock that it would have been a political black eye.
But more importan t, the immensely moralistic
Robert Kennedy was plainly repelled by the idea of
using American soliders against American civilians.
Besides, in his simplified world of black and white.
the Federal Government was so obviously "right"
that a peaceful solution could not help but be found .
Finally , as students of government, the Kennedys
hoped to prove that man y options lay between
inaction and the use of Federal troops: "The year
before, in Montgomery , Alabama. Bob Kennedy in an
all-night vigil had slowly applied pressure through
United States marshals in a highly successful
operation. Violence had been prevented, no troops
had been needed. Oxford was a more difficult case.
but the preparations were even more painstaking,
even more deliberate." (Sidey, .!.F.K. , Pre sid ent. )
It was this rationale that prompted the Executive
Branch to try every possible avenue of persuasion and
conciliation. Burke Marshall , the head of the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, once
remarked that : "Knowledge that the law is going to
be enforced is vital .. . o Very often that knowledge
alone makes conciliation possible. " When Barnett
approached the White House, he may have realized
the inevitability of the outcome, but certainly the
people of Mississippi did not. The problem was that
by the time direct negotiations were held bet ween the
White House and the Governor, the actual method of
solution was out of t heir hands. Barnett had lost
effective control over the masses at Oxford and
neither he nor Washington full y realized that fact.
Yet, as several Department of Justice officials were
later to explain, the nature of the fe deral system
required that a commitment from a state governor -even Barnett -- must be accepted and acted upon until
events demonstrated it to be untrue. And Barn ett had
promised that there would be no trouble on Sunday.
The evidence and the opinions of many observers
are clear: Governor Barnett and the forces allied with
him share the major responsibility for the trouble
which led to the riot of Sunday night. The Court of
Appeals was later to charge that " ... on September 30,
1962, Ross R. Barnett .. . willfully failed to exercise
his responsibility, authority, and influence as
Governor to maintain law and order upon the campus
of the University of Mississippi ... " (330 F.2d 369,
382.)
Although the primary responsibility of the Barnett
administration is clear, the Kennedy administration
can be criticized for considering politics as a major
factor -- leading it to move too late and with too little
strength in enforcing the court order. Of course the
aim was to avoid the type of criticism heaped upon
President Eisenhower for his use of troops at Little

Rock. But it is ironic that President Kennedy was
hurt politically by carefulness that was intended to
appease those segregationists who were not willing to
violate court orders. However, he also would have
been hurt if the choice had been to use soldiers from
the beginning.
Despite these conditions, despite the inherent
limitations we spoke of earlier, and despite the
defiance of a state governor, Presidential decisions
were made during this crisis. Not perhaps the

decisions the President had originally wanted, or with
all the results he had hoped for, but decisions which
nonetheless accomplished the required end. As the
Department of Justice had stated publicly several
days before the riot: "It is our responsibility,
together with the courts, to see that these orders are
obeyed, no matter what course is ultimately
necessary ." And that simple sentence explains what
Presidential Decision-making: The University of
Mississippi, 1962, was all about.

QUIET IN THE COURT
by John H. Somerville
Member of Maryland Bar

Histopcally the courts and legal authorities have
recognized the power of a court to summarily deal
with contempt committed in its presence.Blackstone's
description of the common law practice in contempt
cases appears in 4 Blackstone Commentaries:
The process of attachment for these and the
like contempts must necessarily be as ancient as
the laws themselves; for laws without a
competent authority to secure their
administration from disobedience and contempt
would be vain and nugatory. A power, therefore,
in the supreme courts of justice, to suppress
such contempts by an immediate attachment of
the offender results from the first principles of
judicial establishments, and must be an
inseparable attendant upon every superior
tribunal.

*****

If the contempt be committed in the face of

the court, the offender may be instantly
apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion
of the judges, without further proof or
examination. But in matters that arise at a
distance, and of which the court cannot have so
perfect a knowledge, unless by the confession of
the party or the testimony of others, if the
judges upon affidavit see sufficient ground to
suspect that a contempt has been committed,
they either make a rule on the suspected party
to show cause why an attachment should not
issue against him, or, in very flagrant instances
of contempt, the attachment issues in the first
instance; as it also does if no sufficient cause be
shown to discharge ; and -thereupon the court
confirms and makes absolute the original rule.
The Judici\lrY Act of 1789 provided in section 12:
"That all the said courts of the United States shall

have power to ... punish by fine or imprisonment, at
the discretion of said courts, all contempt of
au.thority in any cause or hearing before the same."
ll1ere was no •. c1efining of the occasions for the
exercise of the power and the courts were left to their
own interpretations based in part upon the traditional
material of the common law and in part upon those
pervading conceptions of the liberty of an individual,
as reflected in the political philosophy of those times.
Needless to say, judges being human, there were
abuses of the exercise of the power and thus began
the process of narrowing and confining the contempt
power, which process has not yet ended today. A
succession of grievances against the exercise of
arbitrary judicial power of contempt under the Act of
1789 culminated in the proceedings of impeachment
against Jam es H. Peck, a judge of the Federal District
Court for the District of Missouri. Judge Peck
imprisoned and disbarred a lawyer for publishing a
detailed criticism of an opinion of his while an appeal
from that decision was pending. Articles of
impeachment were presented by the House of
Representatives, and Judge Peck was put to trial
before the Senate. Peck's conduct was defended
chiefly upon his good faith in following what
purported to be the staunch prededents of the common
law. This defense, accentuated in thi~ instance.by his
age and his blindness, saved the day for the Judge. He
was acquitted, but twenty-one out of forty-three
senators pronounced him "guilty".
In his closing argument Peck's chief counsel,
William Wirt, told the Senate "if the law (of
contempt), as it stands, be disapproved, it is in the
power of Congress to change it." Peck was acquitted
on January 31, 1831 , and on February 1, 1831,
Congress, led by James Buchanan, set in motion the
process to "change it';. The result was the Act of
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1831 which limited the contempt power to punish
misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near
thereto as to obstruct justice; misbehavior of court
officers in their official transactions: and
disobedience of or resistance to the lawful writ,
process, order, or decree of the . court. This is
substantially identical to 18 U.S.C. 401 in force
today, except that section 401 adds the words "and
none other" to the list of contemptible behavior.
The only brea~ in, the narrowing process came in
1918 in Chi'ef Justice White's opinion in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402. The
court stated that the Act of 1831 "conferred no
power not already granted and imposed no
limitations not already existing." The opinion is the
subject of a scathing article by Professors Frankfurter
and Landis in 1924, published in the Harvard Law
Review.

No court put much faith in Chief Justice White's
observation that nothing had changed and the
opinion has been explained away in subsequent cases
as simply unfortunate language. Courts rather than
legislatures have continued the narrowing process.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides in sub-paragraph (a) that "a
criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the
judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and that it was committed
in the actual presence of the court." Under
sub-paragraph (b) all other criminal contempts are to
be prosecuted 0rily upon notice. The same
sub-paragraph (b) also contains that sentence: "If the
contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism
of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at
the trial or hearing except with the defendant's
consent." A study of recent decisions can cause one
to conclude that this qualification is now to be
applied by implication to direct contempts
committed in the court's presence.
Ex Parte Terry, an 1888 case reported at 128 U.S.
289, involved an attorney whose wife became
obstreperous while a spectator to a case in which her
husband, Terry, was counsel. While she was being
removed from the court room, Terry went to her
rescue and was sentenced to six months for
contempt. On appeal, it was held that a court of the
United States upon the commission of a contempt in
open court might upon its own knowledge of the
facts without further proof, without issue or trial,
and without hearing an explanation of the motives of
the offender, immediately proceed to determine
whether the facts justified punishment and to inflict
such punishment was fitting under the law.
Next came Cooke v. United States in 1924, with
Chief Justice Taft's opinion reported in 267 U.S. 517.
This case involved an attorney who should have made
a simple request for a removal to another court, but
who felt constrained to give his reasons for requesting
the removal in the greatest detail, including:
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Prior to the trial of cause No. 984, which has
just concluded, I had believed that Your Honor
·was big enough and broad enough to overcome
the personal prejudice against the defendant
Walker, which I knew to exist, but I find that in
this fond hope I was mistaken. also, my client
desired the privilege of laying the whole facts
before Your Honor in an endeavor to overcome
the effect of the slanders that have been filed in
Your Honor's Court against him personally and
which have been whispered in Your Honor's ears
against him, and in proof of which not one
scintilla of evidence exists in any record ever
made in Your Honor's court.
My hopes in this respect having been rudel y
shattered, I am now appealing purely to Your
Honor's dignity as a Judge and sense of fairness
as a man to do as in this letter requested , and
please indicate to me at the earliest moment
Your Honor's pleasure with respect to the
matters herein presented, so that further steps
may be avoided.
With very great respect, I beg to remain.
Yours most truly ,
Clay Cooke
Eleven days after writing the letter, Cooke learned
of his Honor's pleasure when he was arrested , brought
before the Judge to whom the Jetter was written, and
sentenced to jail. The Supreme Court decided that
the contempt had not been committed in open court
and that due process required that the accused be
advised of the charges and be given a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself.
In 1942, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion in
Pendergast v. U.S. , 317 U.S. 412, which held that
criminal contempt is truly a crime and is subject to
the usual statute of limitations for the prosecution of
crimes.
Next came Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,
which was the contempt proceeding against the
attorneys who represented the eleven Communist
Party leaders in the trial before Judge Harold Medina
in 1949. Upon receiving the verdict of the jury at the
conclusion of the seven months ~rial, Judge Medina,
without further notice or hearing, immediately filed a
certificate of contempt, sixty pages long, against the
five defense attorneys and against Eugene Dennis,
who had acted as his own counsel, sentencing them to
terms varying from thirty days to six months. The
sentences were imposed as to each certified
contempt, but were to be served concurrently.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, it was held (182
F.2d 416) that Judge Medina was not required to cite
and punish each contempt immediately after its
commission, but could wait until the end of the trial.
Judge Hand said that to have done otherwise would
have left the defendants without effective counsel or
with the necessity of choosing new counsel - a
procedure, he noted, involving interminable delay.

The Court ruled that summary punishment could be
imposed some time after the acts were committed.
Jurisdiction for the same is retained throughout the
trial.
The sole question before the Supreme Court was
whether Judge Medina could act under Rule42 (a) or
should have acted under 42(b) and thereby be
disqualified under that sub-section from hearing the
contempt case himself. Mr. Justice Jackson, in the
majority opinion. held that action under 42(a) was
proper and, also. that the word "summary" does not
refer to the timing of the action with reference to the
offense, but refers to that procedure which dispenses
with the formality, delay and digression required for
hearing. arguments. etc. in a conventional trial. If the
judge believes the exigencies of the trial require a
deferring of judgment until its completion he may do
so without extinguishing his power.
Justices Black and Frankfurter dissented saying
that Medina should not have passed on the charges
himself, that a hearing should have been afforded and
the attorneys were, furthermore, entitled to a jury
trial. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in a long dissent,
which includes forty-eight pages of appendix citing
those parts of the record where he felt Judge Medina
had become personally involved in the contempts,
that while 42(a) does not contain the limiting words
found in 42(b), it is nevertheless subject to an
inherent limitation that the power should be fairly
used for the purpose for which it is conferred.
At this point. it might be well to reflect on the
words of Judge Frank in his concurring opinion to
the Second Circuit Court's decision in the Sacher
case:

l
I

Friends of the court have filed with us a large
number of briefs which eloquently recall how, in
the past, courageous lawyers have importantly
contributed to liberty and democracy by
defending unpopular clients, despite the
browbeating of tyrannical, domineering, trial
judges. In those briefs, fear is expressed that, if
we affirm any of the contempt orders in this
case, lawyers for labor unions or for minority
groups or for unpopular persons will, in the
future, be intimidated or throttled.
The eloquence is misplaced. The Fears are
unfounded. We affirm the orders punishing these
lawyers not because they courageously defended
their clients, or because those clients were
Communists, but only because of the lawyers'
outrageous conduct - conduct of a kind which
no lawyer owes his client, which cannot ever be
justified, and which was never employed by
those advocates, for minorities or for the
unpopular, whose courage has made lawyerdom
proud. The acts of the lawyers for the
defendants jn this trial can make no sensible
man proud.

What they did was like assaulting the pilot of
an aeroplane in flight, or turning out the lights
during a surgical operation. To use homelier
words, they tried to throw a wrench in the
machinery of justice. Whatever may have been
their purpose, their acts might have made a trial
of their clients impossible. Not to punish such
behavior summarily, but, instead, to require a
long trial of these lawyers, might well be to
encourage that sort of behavior. The summary
punishment here will tend to deter such
behavior in other trials. If it is not deterred, the
administration of justice in our courts is highly
likely to break down.
The basis of our decision is as simple as that.
We affirm these orders, not because the personal
'dignity' of the trial judge was affronted ; for
such dignity , when it exists, manifests itself,
needs no punitive safeguards. We affirm for the
plain reason that the crude antics of these
lawyers, if copied by lawyers in other cases,
would almost surely disrupt trials.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 1954 turned his dissent
in Sacher into law in Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11. Offutt was the attorney for one Peckham in
a District of Columbia prosecution of his client for
performing an abortion. Offutt was found guilty of
making insolent, insulting and offensive remarks;
talking boisterously; being discourteous ; making false
statements; and asking prejudicial questions without
foundation. The Supreme Court (6 to 3) reversed the
Court of Appeals and ruled that the District Court
Judge had permitted himself to become personally
embroiled with the defendant's counsel and he should
have invited the Chief Judge of the District Court to
assign another judge to sit in hearing of the contempt
charges. Black and Douglas concurred and stated they
also felt a jury trial should have been accorded
Offutt.
In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, decided in
1968, the court held that the constitutional
guarantees of a jury trial extend to serious criminal
contempts and a denial of a requested jury trial to the
defendant, who was sentenced to prison for
twenty-four months for contempt, was error. The
court found, as it had before, that criminal contempt
is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the
law ; and it is a public wrong. Contempt being a crime,
the one cited is entitled to a jury trial , if prayed for.
The Supreme Court set out the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt in Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 , as
follows:
It is not the fact of punishment but rather its
character and purpose that often serve to
distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it
is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial,
and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it
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is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive,
to vindicate the authority of the court. It is true
that punishment by imprisonment may be
remedial, as well as punitive, and many civil
con tempt proceedings have resulted not only in
the imposition of a fine, payable to the
complainant, but also in committing the
defendant to prison. But imprisonment for civil
contempt is ordered where the defendant has
refused to do an affirmative act required by the
provision of an order which, either in form or
substance, was mandatory in its character.
Imprisonment in such cases is inflicted not as
punishment, but is intended to be remedial by
coercing the defendant to do what he had
refused to do. The decree in such cases is that
the defendant stand committed unless and until
he performs the affirmative act required by the
court's order.
With this background let us review what occurred
at the Chicago trial of the Chicago Seven. Bobby
Seale was the Chairman of the Black Panther Party
and was at the time of this trial under indictment in
New Haven, Connecticut, for murder. Seale
apparently argued from the day he entered court on
September 26, 1969, that he had been denied counsel
of his ch'oice. He requested a postponement in August
because his attorney, Charles Garry, would not by the
time of the trial have recovered from a serious
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AMBIGUITY

operation scheduled for September 15 . In the absence
of the postponement, Seale asked to defend himself,
butJ udge Hoffman insisted that Kunstler had entered
an appearance on behalf of Seale, as he, in fact, had
done in order to be allowed to interview Seale at the
jail, and that he was, therefore, Seale's attorney for
all purposes.
Seale carried his protests off reasonably well.
Following opening statements by counsel for
government and defendants' counsel, Judge Hoffman
asked if there were any other statements by attorneys
to be made. Seale stood and moved to the lectern
provided for counsel. Hoffman asked him who his
lawyer was and Seale, unwisely, I believe, instead of
stating he was then acting on his own behalf,
answered "Charles R. Garry." The court noted that
Kunstler had entered an appearance in his behalf, but
when asked by the court, Kunstler refused to make a
statement on behalf of Seale. The Court then called
for the first witness. Two days later, Kunstler again
moved to withdraw his appearance for Seale, but
Judge Hoffman denied the motion, noting that the
trial had begun.
I wiil not review in detail the sixteen separate
items of contempt by Bobby Seale certified to by
Judge Hoffman. Each of them arose out of Seale's
protest that Kunstler did not represent him and he
was being denied his constitutional right to counsel. I
am personally satisfied that what was done is
reversible on appeal because the present Supreme

Court , if not the Court of Ajipeals, will certainly find
the man was not represented by the counsel of his
choice and he was also, under the Bloom decision,
entitled to a jury trial because of the sixteen
consecutive three months sentences. The Bloom case
apparently says that Judge Hoffman should have
cited Seale immediately upon the occurrence of each
contempt and then sentenced him to six months or
less ; otherwise a jury trial is required .
One final quote, this time from the Times article
on February 22 , 1970, is entitled "How Can You
Handle Unruly Defendants."
Certainly no one would deny that the roles of
Judge Hoffman and of Justice Murtagh - and,
po ten ti ally ' of other judges as more and more
radicals are brought to trial - is difficult. It
cannot be pleasant. after all, to sit at the judge's
bench , the focus of several hundred pair of eyes,
and be called a fascist pig. Nor would anyone
deny that epithets and fistfights in court can
eventually erode the process of justice.

But do these problems warrant putting a
defendant under glass or changing court
procedures and rights that are based on centuries
of tradition? One's answer depends in part, on
one's view of the procedures already available to
a judge faced with a rowdy courtroom: the
contempt power ; the authority to physically
restrain the defendant; the ability to declare' a
recess and clear the court.
Two factors are involved with regard to such
proposals: One has to do with their
effectiveness; the other with their
consti tu tionali ty.

*****
In short, the value of courtroom decorum
must be weighted against the problem of queasy
constitutionality in some of the proposals for
insuring that decorum. Then the question
~emains: How important is the old rule, 'Quiet
m the court'?
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THE DRAFT
HISTORY AND CONTITUTIONALITY
hy A ndre w Robert Gree ne '70

This article is adapted from the Selective Service
Law Reporter, Practice Manual. Permission has been
given to reprint this material.
I. The Historical Background of Conscription
There are two historical threads to the law of
conscription, that tracing to the Biblical levee en
masse for the defense of the Israelites (Numbers 1:
1-2 , 46), and that tracing to the poor laws of England
which provided compulsory service as punishment for
the status crime of vagrancy or vagabondage. The
official history of conscription written by the
Selective Service System recognizes only the former
thread and American courts have traditionally upheld
conscription laws under the "levee en masse" or
' "reciprocal obligation of citizenship" rationale,
rejecting the contention that conscription is punitive.
Selective · Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States),

245 U.S. 366 (1918).
Under the English vagrancy statutes, as brought to
full expression under the Elizabethan poor laws,
"rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy beggars'' were subject
to punishment. By a statute of 1703 , they were to be
impressed into "Her Majesty's Service at Sea." But,
conscription was considered unconstitutional except
for the loose, idle, and disorderly. American Civil War
conscription legislation permitted draftees to
purchase release from service by payment of a
bounty, and thus in actual operation carried this
Elizabethan practice forward into American law. The
Act of March 3 , 1863 obligated the government to
provide a substitute (for a payment not to exceed
$300) for a draftee who could not find his own. The
practice contributed significantly to the draft riots by
those unable to purchase release from service. Jerome
Skolnick, in a report to the . National Violence
Commission, has commented: "During the terrible
New York Draft Riots of 1863 , for example, the Irish
of New York not only burned draft offices and
Yankee homes but went on a rampage against the
blacks .... " The rioters captured City Hall and
invoked a reign of terror which lasted four days. The
death toll was enormous, many estimates placing it at
more than 1,000. In order to suppress the rioters, the
government was forced to divert 10,000 troops from
the Gettysburg campaign. It was, in the words of
General Hershey, "the rich man's money and the
poor man's blood."
Conscription's "official" thread really begins in
the post-Revolutionary militia, the Continental
Congress having recommended that a sizeable body of
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men be kept under arms by each stat e. In passing. it
might be pointed out that at the time of the
Revoluuon in 1775, there were more than 650 laws
and ordinances passed by the Colonies and their
political subdivisions providing for conscription in
one form or another. Prior to the Civil War there was
no national conscription system. Instead, levies of
men were made upon the states or voluntary
enlistments were solicited. The early Civil War
conscription system rested on the body of state
conscription laws , and the 1862 conscription law
called for the states to deliver a specified number of
men into national service. The 1863 law, however,
established for the first time a fully federal
conscription system in which draft calls were to be
made by the President. In all, a quarter of a million
men were drafted under the act, although far fewer
than that were delivered into the armed forces. The
Confederacy, too , established a system of
conscription.
In 191 7, the Congress moved to raise a conscript
army for World War 1, roughly in the manner of the
present system. In the 1917 act . local draft boards,
with power to grant deferments and exemptions.
were first created: the power of the President to make
rules and regulations first appears: and bounty and
substitute service were prohibited. The 1917 Act
provided that a registrant was in the military
automatically as of the date mentioned in his order to
report. Thus his contumacy or refusal to report was
punishable by court martial , reviewable only by
habeas corpus.
The 1940 Act has been the model for all
subsequent legislation. The local board structure, the
outlines of the present induction system , the
structure of statutory deferments, the definition of
crimes under the Act and against the ~elective Service
System -- all these features are quite like those
now found in the Military Selective Service Act of
1967 -- the present conscription law. After a hiatus
of 18 months when the I 940 Act was allowed to
expire. conscription was reinstated in 1948 in
substantially its present form. This 1948 legislation
was the country's first peacetime conscription law.
Nineteen fifty-one legislation providing for universal
military training, though it remains a part of the Act;
has not been implemented by Congress and the
President.
II. The Constitutionality of Conscription
Many courts have had occasion to consider the
constitutionality of drafting men into the armed

forces or alternative service (for conscientious
objectors) as a general proposition. Conscription has
been upheld in a line of cases beginning with tllose
arising from Civil War draft legislation in both North
and South. E.g .. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238
( 1863 ), vacated and motion for injunction overruled,
45 Pa. St. 295 (1864 ). The Selective Draft Law of
191 7 was upheld by the Supreme Court in the
Selective Draft Law Cases, supra, as against
contentions that the 1917 Act authorized an exaction
of liberty or property without due process. that
conscription was involuntary servitude, that the Act
improperly delegated legislative, executive and
judicial power. and that the right to raise armies is
limited to executing the laws of the United States,
suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion. In
upholding the World War I draft law, the Court relied
upon the war powers of Congress and the emergency
character of the kgislation in question . Peacetime
conscription has been upheld by courts of appeals,
but the Supreme Court has never confronted the issue
directly.
The power of the Congress to call all citizens into
military - service has been asserted as an overarching
principle of law in a number of cases, and this
"greater power" has been said to support lesser
exercises of power without regard to the manner of
exercise. The constitutional and logical validity of
such arguments is questionable. Assuming that
Congress could. if it wished , call everyone to the
colors. it has not done so. It has been held. therefore,
that classification of who shall serve and who shall
not must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory , and
the process by which classification is accomplished
must not offend due process. Beyond the substantive
and procedural prerequisites to the validity of any
given exaction. questions arise concerning the nature
of the service to be rendered. Congress could not
conscript for service of any kind, although the limits
of its powers have never been clearly marked.
Contemporary American arguments against
conscription fall into several definable categories. It
has been forcefully argued that conscription is
beyond the powers of Congress, because Congress is
limited by Article I to raising armies and to providing
for calling forth the militia to suppress insurrections
and repel invasions. Indeed, it is expressly provided in
,a1rticle I,§8 that the militia thus called into federal
service shall serve under the command of its state
officers, subject to the command of Congress as to its
discipline. This power to raise armies is separate from
that relating to the declaration of war, and it is fairly
clear that the former power does not depend upon
exercise of the latter power. However, it is equally
clear that Congress is not explicitly given the power
to conscript and that the presence of one clause
relating to mobilization of the country - the militia
clause - would on ordinary principles of construction
militate against the presence of the power to mobilize

the nation by another means.
This rationale has some historical evidence in its
support and was the principal basis for the first
opinion in the Kneedler case. However the first
Kneedler holding was rejected in the Selective Draft
Law Cases and has never found authoritative judicial
favor. It is nonetheless the argument which seems to
hew most closely to orthodox principles of
constitutional interpretation.

It has also been argued that conscription violates
the thirteenth amendment, as a form of slavery or
peonage. This view, which was also rejected in the
Selective Draft Law Cases, rests upon an economic
analysis propounded by liberal and conservative
economists alike. Conscription calls for the services of
young men at far less than the market value of such
services. The incidental effect of this underpayment is
to exact forced-draft labor from those called, a kind
of tax, thereby benefiting those in upper-income
brackets who would otherwise have to pay a larger
share of the cost of a volunteer, market-value military
force . For those from whom the labor is exacted at
less than market value, the difference between the
pay they receive and the market value of their
services may be termed an index o f bondage or
peonage.
Finally, conscription has been criticized as an
interference with personal liberty, a claim founded
upon the Ninth Amendment and the due process
clause. Whatever the constitutional basis, the claim is
either
that conscription is absolutely
unconstitutional, or that it is unconstitutional in the
absence of some compelling necessity. The
compelling necessity may be war, and some take the
position that wartime conscription is all right, but not
peacetime conscription. Or the objection may be
phrased in terms of an "alternatives" test; that is, that
this interference with liberty cannot be undertaken
unless and until the alternative of a volunteer army
has been undertaken and shown to be impossible of
attainment.
It must be conceded that these arguments have not
met with judicial approval. But, as recent Supreme
Court cases in the draft area have indicated, there is
always hope that with the proper combination of
facts, circumstances and political atmosphere the
courts can and will make radical changes. ,Ais Mr.
Justice Douglas said in dissent in Holmes v. United
States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968): " ... the question
whether there can be conscription when there has not
been a declaration of war has never been decided by
this Court. It is an important question. It is a
recurring question. It is coming to us in various forms
in many cases as a result of the conflict in Vietnam. I
think we owe to those who are being marched off to
jail for maintaining that a declaration of war is
essential for conscription an answer to this important
undecided constitutional question."
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THE LAW PROFESSOR-IMPEACHABLE?
Patrick S. Duffy '70

Heretofore, legal education has been rigidly
structured so that one cn ld expect little by way of
comparative shopping or the right to inspect and
reject in the legal learning process. A student
exercised limited judgment other than to ascertain
which courses were his responsibility for the semester
or the year and if necessary, determine alphabetically
in which section he belonged. Options, if any, hardly
called for consideration, being either a Hobson 's
choice between equally undesirable professors and
hours or reminiscent of the old English "praecipe,"
commanding the defendant to do the thing required,
0r show cause wherefore he had not done it.
Registration merely amounted to the. additional
protracted tedium of having the university ratify law
school predeterminations in the interests of billing.
This generalized university learning process was
zealously perpetuated in the best traditions of
academic mediaevalism.
With the introduction of the elective came the first
academic bilateral glimmerings of needs determining
output in course offerings and professors. At many
universities students introduced a consumer report
that became the vade mecum reference for
registration and program planning. The debate is no
longer as to whether we should have student ratings
of professors but rather centers around methods of
refining the procedures involved so as to insure
reliable ratings. However, many still refuse to
countenance or participate in the process and their
misgivings merit an airing. After all, everyone knows
that Professor A is belligerent or threatening and
weeds out the faint-hearted with horrendous outside
reading together with impossible examinations and
grades. Why bother to establish the coefficient of
correlation between the foregoing factors and his
poor teaching? Why publish the well-known fact that
Professor B is a gentleman and a scholar, or that Mr.
X is hardly ever prepared and that Mr. Y would have
difficulty as a Montessori teachers aid? Even the
bartenders at Dick and Garry's know which beverages
correlate with different years and courses in law
school.
The student is part of an age crying out for truth in
every section of society and such a movement must
have a hearing. He resolves his annual investment in
law into dollars per hour and is becoming increasingly
aware of fair market legal value. In most cases, he himself is paying for this graduate education so hopefully,
some notions from contract law should influence his
thinking. Some students who now enjoy breakfast in
11
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bed are merely awaiting cable television and the
possibility of turning on a master for an hour's
illumination in any area of law for just a mere
pittance in the slot. This sophisticated threat to the
academic establishment and the classroom osmosis
theory should not be lightly equated with the La
Salle method. What alternative does a student have
when confronted with "a teacher" who has never
taught before and who will practice teaching at his
expense, deciding after six, twelve or eighteen months
of much trial and considerable error to abandon
teaching in favor of legal practice? What are the viable
alternatives to a teacher who lacks legal experience.
an experienced lawyer who lacks teaching experience,
or a monitor who lacks both? I submit the thesis that
administrators who expose students at their expense
of time and money to the discovery that a teacher is a
no-no in a classroom are always guilty of contractual
unconscionability and bad faith when they do so
knowingly.
Of course, law students do not hold the absurd
notion that all teachers are born equal ; and they are
realistic enough to know that all schools have their
quotas in this regard ; but they resent being asked to
take it on faith that the best combination of teachers
and courses in the legal world awaits them. In an age
of participatory democracy they find it necessary to
· assert that the teacher is beholden to them as a
matter of contract. As to mutuality, students regard
it as their prerogative to express their estimate of the
teaching enterprise in a given classroom without
prejudice to the professor's judgment of the learning
process in the same classroom. The only weak link in
this proposition is on the professor's side and relies
for its support on the external pressures in our
establishments that compel universities to coerce
professors into rating students. Latter-day students
do not look kindly on this intruding contractual term
with its arbitrary professorial tender of consideration
to third parties.
Some professors resent and dismiss student
evaluations of professors as popularity contests. With
serious scholarly mien they refuse to be rated on
what they regard as personality variables and in
support of this view they quote the reaction of the
professor who received a poor rating, "I guess I'll
have to put out a few hundred extra dollars on beer
next year." No one will deny a degree of subjec;tivism
and selective judgment in these ratings, particularly
when poor rating scales are employed and boyhood
bias is not statistically controlled. Law students as a

whole behave like graduate students and it should be
assumed, given respectable admission policies, that
their sacrifices for a legal education imply a
seriousness of purpose not misled for long by a
sparkling personality or a misplaced regular guy at a
teaching podium.
Professors are still heard to maintain that it is not
in the right "order of things" (shades of order in law)
that a student in virtue of his inferior status should be
permitted to evaluate a superior. In essence this
argument maintains that a law student is incompetent
to judge the training process he is undergoing. Who is
in a better position than the student to know whether
or not he is learning the law'? Only to the extent that
the teacher is tuned in to learning receptivity will his
teaching improve. To relegate feedback to a final
examination is another facet of academic
mediaevalism, and poor examinations constitute a
belated indictment of a teacher. It goes without
saying that a comprehensive evaluation of teaching
should encompass the validity of accompanying
examinations. Ideally, truth in testing should be
bilateral. "Even superficial experience teaches us that
the results of an examination are valid only for the
day when it is held" (Herbert, Brief Encyclopedia,
sec. 105).
True, a student may not accurately assess the
depth of a professor's knowledge of his subject but if
his teaching is not judged by his students it will not
be assessed . Peer estimates of professors' teaching
ability can be dismissed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and the cat and mouse games between
inadequate professors and inept administrators defy
the application of any reform theory that
presupposes clean hands.
During the course of his training, a law student is
expected to absorb the legal issues of man's past and
future while forming mature judgments about

society. In law school these days he is already
expected as an embryonic lawyer to invade society
and indict corruption and injustice under any
establishment badge. Surely a little of this reforming
charity could be spared for the academic home front
where conflicts of interest abound and both teacher
and student substantive rights are fractured as a
matter of policy or abridged with impunity . Law
students could gain much experience close to home if
only in fact finding or arbitration and in the process
help the helpless to clean up the academic
environment. If student activism in contemporary
society is powered by mature convictions surely their
ideas should have some validity when it comes to the
excellence and integrity of their own university and
their school together with its administrators,
professors and the local academic package.
If their views on their academic experience are
worth recording then they should be accorded a high
priority and not be relegated to last minute
haphazard interim negotiations between the Student
Bar Association and administrators or random faculty
members. Sophisticated rating scales which are
statistically reliable can be acquired with a modicum
of cost. The mechanical problems of sampling and
accurate interpretation would certainly not exceed
the competency required for an average morning's
supererogation devoted to a law review and the
perpetuation of a segregated elite. Accurate
consistent ratings followed by administrative specific
performance should guarantee a respected place at
the Bar for a student majority serious about the
proficiency of a school.
Men must be able to assume that those
with whom they deal in the general
intercourse of society will act in good faith
- Pound.
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THE WEDNESDAY NIGHT THAT WAS
by Barbara Bamford "70

This evening, March 4, 1970, at the student-faculty
discussion of the proposed "Five Point Plan," I stated
that my objection to the plan was that certain
"incompetent" faculty members whose classes are
unworthy of attendance would be authorized by the
proposal to unjustly penalize students for their
absence. I believe that my statement, as far as it went,
was misleading and perhaps unduly harsh, and I
would like to clarify and expand upon it.
First, I neglected to state that the "incompetence"
to which I referred is the exception rather than the
rule. I believe that our faculty is on the whole
intelligent, stimulating, hard-working, and
enthusiastic (would that the students would display
such alacrity; I will discuss student preparedness
below). The vast majority of the faculty was outside
the intended scope of my remark, although even
among them there is room for improvement which I
will suggest below. Furthermore, I doubt that there is
a single faculty member who does not have good
intentions, or who would consciously make
inequitable use of the Five Point Plan. Undoubtedly,
the grading discretion which the plan provides would
in most cases be used to the students advantage.
Second, rather than "incompetent," I should have
said "boring and a waste of time." I did not mean
incompetence in the sense of unfitness, for if any of
our faculty were actually unfit for the classroom, as I
would define that unfortunately vague concept, we
would not need to complain about them. We could
dismiss them for cause despite tenure. Incidentally,
how do you define unfitness sufficient to justify
dismissal? Is unprofessional conduct necessary? Is
continued lack of preparation sufficient? How about
the professor who keeps a day ahead of the students
as far as the textbook is concerned, but doesn't know
anything else about his subject area? Is he competent
if he is willing to research the questions students ask
(which he never can answer authoritatively), and
incompetent if he is not? In any event, such
continued behavior is difficult, and embarrassing to
prove, and probably the best means of ridding the
faculty of an undesirable member, competent or not,
is a student boycott, by failure to subscribe to or
attend his classes. (I note that this idea is not new!)
My remark, then, was directed toward a few "bad"
or useless teachers as opposed to good teachers.
Several faculty members have requested, quite
justifiably, that I elucidate my views on what
constitutes good and bad teaching, taking into
PAGE 22/SPRING 1970

consideration the common faculty complaint that
students are perpetually unprepared. Because I feel
that the quality of teaching and student preparedness
are intimately related, I shall discuss both subjects
together.
Bad Law School Teaching

Teacher T asks Student S' to give the facts of an
assigned case. If S' has read the case (and maybe even
if he hasn't, if the case is short enough to scan while
speaking), he recites the facts. Meanwhile those
students who have read the case are bored, and those
who have not read the case have an opportunity to do
so, and valuable class time is consumed. T then asks
S' or another student to give the holding, and perhaps
the reasons stated by the court. T then asks another
student to give the facts of the next case, perhaps
commenting, first, on textual notes appearing
between the cases. If S' has not read the case, T either
chastises him or not, either records the fact or not,
and repeats his question for S". T may fear loss of
respect or he may be embarrassed for students when
they are forced to admit their lack of pre para ti on, so
he calls on students in a predictable order, or he does
not call on them at all, but rather recites all the facts
and holdings of the cases himself. In either case, those
who cannot possibly be called on during a given class
period are undoubtedly unprepared and are either
uninvolved in the "class discussion", or furiously
taking notes on R's or another student's oral brief of
each case, so that they will never have to read the
cases. What better way is there to use the class time?
Why read the cases prior to class, should it be
inconvenient to do so as long as they can be read in time
for the final exam, if necessary? The student has
nothing to gain by being prepared, unless he may be
called upon to recite, for all T does is reiterate the
cases, and they are in the book. And even if S may be
called upon, T quickly lets him off the hook,
although under the new plan s may lose a few points
from his final grade for poor class participation. If T
threatens to reduce grades on account of poor
preparation or attendance, class preparedness and
attendance may increase, but learning does not. For
by T's teaching method, learning is confined to
remembering the holdings of cases in the textbook,
and this memory work can be done inside or out of
class, any time before the final examination.

Good Law School Teaching

Teacher T wants the students to think about a
certain assigned case. He states only enough of the
facts and holding necessary to recall which case from
the assignment he intends to discuss (or he elicits
short answers from students to accomplish the same
result). E.G. , "This was the case about a corporate
spin-off, not a merger or acquisition." Or, "What kind
of corporate reorganization was involved here?" Then
"Why should it get different tax treatment?" or
"What do you suppose is the policy behind this law?"
"Should it be changed? To what?" Or, "Is this case
still valid in view of X v.Y? Are they consistent?
Should they be consistent? How would this court rule
under this hypothetical, where fact A is changed to
fact B'? To fact C? How would you rule? There's a
case on this. Here's the citation. . . " T does not
recite or ask for a recitation of all the facts. The
students have read the cases. (If they haven't, they
regret it, for they can 't follow the analysis, and they
can't get it out of the book later.) T brings out only
those facts which distinguish the case under
discussion from previous or other assigned cases. He
does not concentrate on only one student, but rather
skips around the room randomly to get all students
involved on each case. If he chances to call on a
student who is unprepared , he does not chastise him
or record the fact. Rather he briefly states the
distinguishing facts and the holding to the student,
and then pursues his regular line of questions, forcing
the unprepared student to analyze the case just as
though he had read it. The student will be at a
disadvantage, of course, and his unconsidered
judgment as to whether the case was correctly
decided (or whatever other question T forces him to
answer) may well be poor. But his faulty analysis,
unlike the statement "I am not prepared," will reflect
on his native intelligence, and he will not easily forget
his embarrassment, particularly when other students
are eager to correct him. Furthermore, he will be
contributing his ideas, perhaps novel because of his
"fresh" approach, to the class discussion. Most
important for him and for those who have been wise
enough to prepare, T's students are all engaged in the
process of creative thought. They are learning to
reason like lawyers, to be critical, to ask themselves
questions. If they cut class, they may acquire legal
knowledge on their own by reading the cases. But
chances are, they will not ask themselves all of the
relevant questions as they read, or the answers may
not be readily available to them. The students know
this, and their attendance is good. Furthermore, they
know that they must retain a certain amount of
knowledge as they go along, rather than acquire it the
day or week before the examination, for at any time
they may be called upon to compare old cases with
new ones. This shifts some of the burden of recall

from the teacher, and encourages the students to think
up questions and problems which the teacher may
have overlooked. Finally, although it may appear that
briefing a case in class for an unprepared student
consumes an unwarranted amount of time, it should
be noted that this experience need not be repeated
often before all of the students will be careful to be
prepared.
If it appears that the dichotomy I have drawn
between bad T and good T is unrealistic, I had several
specific professors in mind for each category. The
basic distinction is in the approach T takes ·to the
subject matter of his course. Bad T offers nothing to
the students which they cannot provide for
themselves on their own time, whereas good T offers
them a thought-provoking, exciting experience which
they do not want to miss. The correlation between
quality of teaching and student preparedness is not so
high as that between quality of teaching and
approach to subject matter. Many of our good
teachers treat unprepared students in a manner
exemplified by my bad T, but our best, most
exciting, most admired teachers use good T's method ;
generally, Mr. Lanning was a shining example. It
would appear to be an invariable rule that those
professors who are most preoccupied with discipline
are the least preoccupied with teaching.
Of course, there will always be times when
students cannot prepare, even for the best teachers,
and there will always be some students who are
conscientious enough to prepare regularly even for
unstimulating teachers. The argument that a student
should feel a duty to prepare for the sake of his
fellow students is spurious; we are simply not such
thoughtful creatures, and if we were, it would be the
teacher that we would be bailing out, not the
students. There will also be times when a professor is
justifiably unprepared. When this is the case, he
should postpone the class, rather than lose the
rapport he has built up with the students. Impressions
of poor teaching are unfortunately hard to forg~t,
and the student may decline to prepare regularly m
the future if he thinks that the teacher's performance
is sporadic. It should be noted that when a student
does not have time to prepare for a good teacher, he
is more likely to attend the class unprepared than to
cut it, as he would in the case of a bad teacher. In my
case at least when I am caught unprepared, the
teacher ought' to be complimented that I think his
class is sufficiently worthwhile that I have decided to
endure an hour of likely confusion.
Students tend to make flippant remarks when
caught unprepared which have given many teachers
the erroneous impression that most students are
indifferent to the learning process. The fact is, many
or most students have time-consuming activities such
as Moot Court, Law Review, Student Legal Services,
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under the proposed Five Point Plan.
I have tried to present some constructive ideas on
classroom teaching which because of time and subject
limitations it was impossible for me to state at the
meeting. I have also tried to answer the faculty
complaint about student unpreparedness, because I
feel that the two subjects cannot be treated
separately. I want to emphasize, additionally, that
although there will always be cases of unjustified
laziness on the part of students, this cannot excuse
lazy teaching, even for those students. The teacher
should seek not only to stimulate interested students,
but to change the attitudes of those students who
appear to be indifferent to learning.

and employment, which make it impossible for them
to allocate time for class preparation on a daily or
regular basis. The student who is employed full-time
must do most of his reading on weekends. The
student who is temporarily engaged full-time in
writing his annual Law Review article or in preparing
his Moot Court project may have to postpone class
preparation and perhaps class attendance in order to
meet an impending deadline. The faculty should not
be discouraged by the fact that a student is
sporadically (as opposed to continually) unprepared,
for he has probably spent the time in other
educational activities. The faculty should keep this in
mind when they are assessing a student's attitude

GRADUATING CLASS

The following seniors have secured the following
positions. This list is by no means complete but is
merely to serve as an example of positions secured by
this year's class of graduates.
Bamford, Barbara A. - Shearman and Sterling, New
York
Brauer, Dave - Hon. Jack D. H. Hays, Justice of the
Supreme Court of Arizona
Connor, Martin E. - White and Case, New York

McGillan, James - Patton, Blow, Verrill, Brand and
Boggs, District of Columbia
Romanski, Dave Pennsylvania

Fellowship at University of

Schimel, Ronald - Hon. Frederick Singley, Maryland
Court of Appeals
Walter, Clark E. - Donovan, Leisure, Newton and
Irvine, New York

Carey, Tyre, Bannerman, and

Welch, Eugene - Hon. Hulerey Robinson, United
States District Court for District of Columbia

Donohue, Barry J. - Hon. T. James Tumulty,
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division

CAVEAT: Better start work soc;m on resumes! The
summer is an excellent time to start researching for
the job of the future.

Daniele, Jennie R. Wallace.

Dunham, Frank - Hon. Oren Harris, United States
District Court for Virginia
Fallon, James, M. - Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept.
of Justice, District of Columbia

B.J. EPPS MOTOR CO.

Greco, Carmel J. - Murphy and Niles, New York
Higgins, James - Federal Trade Commission, District
of Columbia
Jilian, John, Jr. - Killoran and Van Brunt, Delaware
Langlois, David Peter - Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer and Wood, New York
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Long, Edward W. - Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and
Alexander, District of Columbia
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